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Abstract 
Despite intensive research there is no clear evidence for a link between lottery risk 
preferences and risk involved in trusting others. We argue that this is partially due to a 
misalignment of the underlying sources of risk. Trusting is giving up control to a human 
source of risk while lottery risk has a mechanistic source. We propose a risky trust game that 
experimentally elicits social risk preferences that pertain to the same underlying human 
source. Our results show that transfers in the classic trust game are indeed best explained 
by social risk preferences and not by lottery risk preferences with an underlying mechanistic 
source. In addition, we argue that the type of uncertainty also plays a role. In the absence of 
objectively known probabilities of trustworthiness, trust also has an ambiguous component. 
We therefore decompose uncertainty in the trust game into social risk and an ambiguous 
component. Our results provide evidence that, when accounting for social risk, subjects who 
score high on ambiguity tolerance explain some of the remainder of trusting behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
Trust involves “the willingness to increase one’s vulnerability to another whose 
behavior is not under one’s control” (Zand, 1972). Consequently, uncertainty about the 
trustee’s behavior affects the decisions of the trustor. The literature distinguishes two types 
of uncertainty (Knight, 1921; Wakker, 2010). Risk (exogenous uncertainty) is characterized 
by objectively known probabilities, while ambiguity (endogenous uncertainty) is 
characterized by the absence of objectively known probabilities. Many situations of social 
interaction contain both types of uncertainty, with pure risk and pure ambiguity being the 
special, limiting cases. In this paper we decompose uncertainty in trust decisions by 
degenerating the trust game into decisions under pure risk, while attempting to explain the 
remaining behavior in the trust game with ambiguity preferences.1  
In addition, we suggest that not only the type of uncertainty, but also the source of 
uncertainty plays an important role in trust situations. A source of uncertainty is a specific 
event that is generated by one common mechanism of uncertainty (Abdellaoui et al., 2011). 
Eckel and Wilson (2004) study correlations among various risk preference measures and 
conclude that their data is “inconsistent with the notion that individuals have a fixed, domain-
general utility function that is applicable to all risky situations”. In both risky and ambiguous 
environments attitudes towards uncertainty seem to depend on their source (Abdellaoui et 
al., 2011). By varying the source of uncertainty, the same individual may thus experience a 
decision situation differently although outcome and probabilities do not change.  
Many previous experimental studies on the role of risk preferences in trust decisions 
do not take the source of uncertainty into account and cannot identify a clear link between 
trust behavior and trustors’ lottery risk preferences (Eckel and Wilson, 2004; Ashraf et al., 
2006; Ben-Ner and Halldorsson, 2010; Houser et al., 2010; and Etang et al., 2011).2 In this 
paper, we argue that the lottery setup, which is typically used to elicit risk preferences, has a 
different underlying source than the trust game and therefore distorts the measurement of 
risk attitudes that are relevant in trusting behavior. The essential difference between the 
                                               
1 Such decomposition procedure is supported by recent neuroimaging research suggesting that risk 
and ambiguity are two separate processes that take place in two separate brain areas. Processing of 
risk preferences can be traced back to brain areas known for its reward anticipation processing 
whereas ambiguity preferences correspond to vigilance/evaluating processing (Hsu et al., 2005; 
Huettel et al., 2006). To be more precise, risk preferences can be traced back to activity in the 
striatum. Ambiguity preferences, on the other hand, can be located in the amygdala and orbitofrontal 
cortex, which correspond to affective processing (Phelps, 2006). 
2
 The risk preferences are measured by a variety of tools, e.g. by questionnaires like Zuckerman’s 
sensation scale (Eckel and Wilson, 2004), a lottery setup (Holt and Laury, 2002) with a menu of pair 
wise comparisons of two lotteries (Eckel and Wilson, 2004, Ben-Ner and Halldorsson 2010, Houser et 
al., 2010), or by a task involving a choice between a lottery and a certainty equivalent, which mirror 
the distribution of outcomes in the trust games (Eckel and Wilson, 2004; Schechter, 2007), or not 
(Etang et al., 2011). 
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sources of risk in a lottery environment and of risk in a trust environment is that, even if both 
have the same objective probabilities and outcomes, the former relies on a mechanistic 
randomization device while the latter relies on the decision of another human being. 
To elicit risk attitudes in coherence with the risks attached to trusting we develop a 
‘risky trust game’ where risk is based on the same source of uncertainty and within the same 
framing as in the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995). In the risky trust game, the 
trustor places her trust in a randomly chosen trustee, who is part of a randomly drawn group 
of four trustees from the total population. This implies five potential scenarios of 
trustworthiness where none, one, two, three, or all four of the trustees in the group decide to 
be trustworthy. The crucial difference to the classic trust game setting is that the trustor can 
condition her transfer to each of the five possible scenarios of trustworthiness of the four 
trustees. The actual decisions made by the four trustees will determine which of the trustor’s 
conditional choices will matter and determine the payoff-relevant transfer.  
The risky trust game is free of any ambiguity, because it contains a priori given and 
known probabilities for all possible states of trustworthy behavior by the payoff-relevant 
trustee. As such it replicates a risky bet against nature, like in a lottery. The important 
difference is that the source of the risk is not a mechanistic device, but a decision made by a 
human being. Henceforth, we refer to this kind of risk as ‘social risk’, in contrast to lottery 
risk.3 
We calculate subjects’ social risk preferences from their choices in the risky trust 
game. Furthermore, we confront all subjects with a standard Holt and Laury (2002) lottery. 
By relating lottery risk preferences and social risk preferences to transfers in the classic trust 
game, we can directly test whether a mechanistic or a human source is better able to explain 
the risky component of uncertainty in trusting decisions. 
The first attempt of a direct assessment of risk in a trust setting can be found in 
Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004). In their experiments with a binary trust game, they elicit the 
minimum acceptable probability of being matched to a trustworthy trustee for which the 
trustor would choose to trust. This design ultimately converts the trusting decision into a 
decision under risk, because the trustor can condition trusting on the (subjective belief of 
the) trustworthiness of the trustees. The authors show that such a trusting decision is more 
than betting. Trustors reveal a higher willingness to bet on “trust” when a lottery generates 
the outcomes than when trustees decide. The authors refer to the costs of losing control to 
the benefit of trustee as betrayal aversion.4 
                                               
3
 Social risk comprises both strategic risk and social preferences a trustor might hold towards the 
trustee. 
4
  Recently Aimone and Houser (2012) corroborated this phenomenon in an experimental design that 
isolated the effect of betrayal aversion. 
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Although Bohnet and Zeckhauser find that decisions differ between trust and risk 
environments, this is not supported by Kosfeld et al. (2005). Houser et al. (2010) argue that 
these conflicting results can be due to the fact that both their analyses are based on 
aggregate data analyses of distributions between games. By collecting individual-level data 
on risk attitudes Houser et al. (2010) control for individual heterogeneity. Their experimental 
design consists of four variations of the trust game. In two of them, the decision maker 
places a bet, and the return is decided by the computer according to a known probability 
distribution. The return decision either affects only the decision maker, or it also affects a 
dummy player. Comparison of these two variants allows addressing the role of social 
preferences in placing the bet. Its role, however, is found to be negligible. In two other 
treatments, the return decision is made by a trustee, not by a computer. The trustor has 
either no information about the trustworthiness of the trustee, or (s)he receives information 
about a “typical behavior“ of the trustees (with a notice that it is “no guarantee how decisions 
might be made in their session”). Houser et al. (2010) find that the Holt & Laury risk 
preference measure explains behavior in their computer risk treatments, but not in the 
interpersonal treatments. They state that “this finding does not necessarily imply that risk 
attitudes are unimportant to trusting decisions, but it does suggest that, to the extent that risk 
attitudes do modulate trusting decisions, the mechanism remains to be discovered.”  
Both Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), and Houser et al. (2010) measure risk 
preferences by aligning the source of uncertainty with that of the trust game. However, risk in 
the trust game is simulated via information about the distribution of trustees’ decisions from 
previous rounds (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004) or experiments (Houser et al., 2010). Also, 
in Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) this procedure is not made public to the trustors. Thus, 
although in both studies the sources of risk refer to a trust setting, when eliciting risk 
preferences the risk profile (of trustees’ return decisions) must be translated from earlier 
rounds or sessions with a loss of transparency or reliability. We avoid such problems in our 
experiments. 
Next to risk preferences, we also attempt to identify ambiguity as a second type of 
uncertainty that plays a role in trust decisions. For this, we elicit subjects’ attitudes to 
ambiguity with two different procedures: mechanistic two-color Ellsberg urn (Ellsberg, 1961); 
and a more contextual questionnaire that has been shown to relate to ambiguity in a broader 
setting (Sherman, 1974; Camerer and Weber, 1992).  
Prior literature provides little evidence to which extent uncertainty in a situation of 
trust pertains to risk and to ambiguity. Social psychologists distinguish between personal 
trust, demonstrated in close-knit personal relationships, and generalized trust “when no 
specific information is provided concerning a particular person” (Yamagischi et al., 1999). 
The latter is similar to the setting in a trust game, but also to situations in modern societies, 
5 
 
where many day to day interactions occur with strangers and the establishment of general 
trust therefore takes place outside a person’s long-run relationships within small 
communities. In such societies, trust has been associated “with unavoidable social 
uncertainty” (Bicchieri et al. 2011, Yamagischi and Yamagischi, 1994) where “possible future 
behavior of people is subject to more radical form of uncertainty” (Noteboom, 2007). Hence, 
generalized trust, whether in the anonymity of modern societies or in the anonymity of the 
laboratory, may be affected by attitudes towards ambiguity, possibly even more so than by 
risk preferences.  
Our results show that our measure of social risk preferences is indeed able to 
capture the risk component in the trust game. We find that social risk preferences measured 
in the risky trust game explain transfers in the classic trust game, while lottery risk 
preferences do not. This suggests that the source of uncertainty plays an important role 
when relating risk preferences to trust behavior. As in Houser et al. (2010), the inclusion of 
unconditional social preferences does not alter our results, and it does not explain trusting. 
With regard to ambiguity we find explanatory power for a questionnaire measure of 
‘ambiguity tolerance’. This indicates that a decomposition of uncertainty into risk and 
ambiguity is possible for trusting decisions. In line with our results on risk preferences and 
trust, we also find indications that the sources of uncertainty may play a role in the 
measurement of ambiguity, as lottery ambiguity does not explain transfers in the trust game, 
while the questionnaire measure of ambiguity tolerance does.  
This paper contributes to the pertaining literature in several ways: First, we contribute 
to the continuing discourse on the role of risk in trust decisions by providing evidence that 
sources matter when measuring risk attitudes. Second, we provide an first attempt to 
disentangle risk from ambiguity in trust decisions. Ambiguity preferences have hardly been 
addressed in relation to trust decisions.5 In this paper we provide early indications that 
trustors’ ambiguity preferences can at least partially explain generalized trust in anonymous 
interactions, which are studied in most trust game experiments. Third, we develop a simple 
design for measuring social risk in trust. Our setting hardly deviates from the classic trust 
game, but nevertheless reduces the trust decision to a decision under objective risk. The 
risky trust game elicits risk preferences based on the same source of uncertainty as the 
classic trust game. Both games can be administered in the same session and thus draw 
from the very same group of individuals. By using a within subject design we control, like 
Houser et al. (2010), for individual effect confounds due to individual heterogeneity. Finally, 
unlike previous studies, our distribution of trustees’ return decisions in the risky trust game is 
neither historically obtained (Houser et al., 2010), nor referred to as ‘usually observed’ from 
                                               
5
 To the best of our knowledge, Corcos et al. (2012) is the only exception. 
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previous rounds (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004). It represents the actual and relevant 
distribution of the trustworthy trustees they currently interact with. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we explain 
the experimental design and procedures. In Section 3, we present our results. Section 4 
concludes. 
2. Experimental design and procedures 
2.1 The source of risk in the trust game 
The underlying game that we study is the trust game by Berg, Dickhout and McCabe 
(1995). The first mover, trustor, decides how much of his or her endowment E = 10 tokens (1 
token = €0,50) to transfer to the second mover, the trustee. Transfer x {0, 1, …, 9, 10} is 
multiplied by three before reaching the trustee. The trustees make a binary choice between 
honoring the trust by returning half of the received money, and betraying the trust by 
returning nothing of the received amount.6   
We study two versions of the trust game. In the classic trust game the trustors face 
ambiguity, because they have no information about the objective probability distribution of 
trustworthiness in the population of trustees. We therefore refer to this (classic) version as 
the ambiguous trust game (ATG). In the risky trust game (RTG), the trustor knows the 
probability of trustworthiness among the trustees when making a decision. This is achieved 
by implementing the Conditional Information Lottery design developed by Bardsley (2000).7  
To operationalize our design, the trustors receive information that four trustees from 
the population of all trustees have been randomly assigned to them; and that one of these 
four trustees will be selected at random, and matched to them after the trustees’ decisions 
have been made. In the RTG, the trustor is confronted with all possible combinations of 
decisions of the four trustees. This implies five potential scenarios of trustworthiness where 
either none, one, two, three, or all four of the four trustees choose to return one half of the 
received amount, while the rest (if relevant) returns nothing. In the moment of the decision 
making, the trustor does not know which of these five possible scenarios will materialize. 
But, once the four trustees are matched to the trustor, and we observe their decisions, one 
of these five scenarios describes the actual distribution of the trustworthiness among them 
and determines the payoff-relevant transfer. Allowing the trustors to condition their transfers 
                                               
6
 Such restricted trustee strategy set is also used by Bohnet and Zechkauser (2004). Restricting the 
trustees’ strategy set allows us to clearly distinguish trustworthy behavior from free riding, and 
simplifies the implementation of the risky trust game.  
7 The Conditional Information Lottery offers all the benefits associated with deception in experiments, 
without actually deceiving anyone. The deceptive scenarios of designs which use deceit are replaced 
with fictitious scenarios, each of which, from a subject’s viewpoint, has a chance of being true 
(Bardsley, 2000). 
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in the RTG on all possible scenarios of trustworthiness that may arise transforms the trust 
decision into a decision under risk with objectively known probabilities and eliminates 
ambiguity. The source of risk, however, is identical to the trust game, because it stems from 
the same group of players in the same session. 
In the experiment, trustors in the RTG thus made five decisions, x0, x1,…,x4, where xi, 
i=0,1…,4, denotes the transfer conditional on being matched to a group of i trustworthy 
trustees. The actual and payoff relevant scenario was determined after the four trustees 
made their decisions. One of these four assigned trustees was then selected at random, and 
his/her decision was used to calculate the payoffs in the trust game for the trustor and for the 
selected trustee.  
For comparability reasons, we implemented the same matching procedure in the 
ATG. Each trustor was assigned to four trustees, and one of the four trustees was randomly 
selected as the payoff-relevant trustee for the trustor. In the ATG, however, the trustor could 
not condition the transfer on any information about the probability distribution of 
trustworthiness among these four trustees. The trustor thus acted under ambiguity without 
any objectively known probabilities about the trustworthiness of the trustees. Ex post, the 
trustor is only informed about the decision of the payoff-relevant trustee.  
Both variants of the trust game were implemented behind the veil of ignorance.8 That 
means that all players had to submit their strategies for the role of a trustor and for the role 
of a trustee. At the end of the experiment, one of these roles was assigned to each subject, 
and only the decisions in the assigned role became payoff-relevant for the subject.  
For each subject, we estimate his/her social risk preferences by using the 
decisions in the five conditional scenarios in the RTG. The expected utility of a trustor 
transferring xi of an initial endowment (E) to a population with a fraction of p trustworthy 
trustees (p=  , who return half of the tripled transfer, is given by: 
 
      (1) 
 
We assume the functional form of the utility function to be the power 
function , also well known as the family of constant relative risk aversion (Holt 
and Laury, 2002; Wakker, 2008). The first order conditions of the expected utility 
maximization imply:  
 
                                               
8
 It has been shown that having subjects engage in both roles as trustor and trustee can have a 
negative impact on trustworthiness (Casari and Cason, 2009), but, to the best of our knowledge, no 
studies have shown any significant effects on trust (Johnson and Mislin, 2011).  
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         (2) 
 
The parameter α is estimated by means of a least square estimation. The main 
difference between the RTG and the methods of prior studies to capture trustors’ risk 
preferences is that the structure of the RTG is identical to the trust decision in the ATG, with 
the exception of the information about the trustworthiness of the trustees. In this way, we 
align the sources of uncertainty the decision maker faces across the RTG and ATG. This 
allows us to use the measure of social risk preferences (α), obtained from the RTG, to 
explain trust decisions in the ATG. 
In order to test if subjects’ social risk preferences provide a better explanation for the 
variation of trust in the ATG than subjects’ lottery risk preferences, we also measure lottery 
risk preferences with a standard lottery setup (Holt and Laury, 2002). In this task subjects 
make a sequence of choices between two lotteries with changing probabilities of given 
outcomes. We use the number of the individual’s more risky choices as our measure of 
lottery risk preferences.9 
 
2.2 The role of ambiguity in the trust game 
In the absence of a ‘standard tool’ to elicit ambiguity aversion, we choose two 
measurements. One is based on the Ellsberg urn in a standard lottery environment as 
applied in previous experiments (Fox and Tversky, 1995; Hogarth and Villeval, 2010). In our 
setting it has the drawback that it has a different (lottery) source of ambiguity than trust 
decisions. We therefore also administer a broad case-based questionnaire measure 
(Budner, 1962), which is inspired by findings that questionnaire measures might be better 
suited to capture the full spectrum of sources of ambiguity (Cabantous, 2007; Ghosh and 
Ray, 1997). 
To elicit lottery ambiguity preferences, each subject makes a sequence of 20 pair 
wise choices between a lottery with a known composition of the urn and a certainty 
equivalent (risk task); as well as a sequence of 20 pair wise choices between a lottery with 
an unknown composition of the urn and a certainty equivalent (ambiguous task). The 
complete list of choices for this and other tasks can be found in the instructions in the 
appendix. The number of lottery choices in the risk task minus the number of lottery choices 
in the ambiguous task, represents an individual measure of ambiguity aversion: ambiguity 
seekers (avoiders) switch sooner in the risk (ambiguity) than in the ambiguity (risk) task, 
resulting in a negative (positive) value.  
                                               
9 Some subjects switch more than once from the safer to the more risky lottery. In line with Holt and 
Laury (2002) we counted the number of risky options (option B) a subject has chosen in the lottery. 
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The questionnaire measure of ambiguity, henceforth ambiguity tolerance, is 
Budner’s 16-item scale (Budner, 1962). Intolerance for ambiguity is understood as the 
tendency to perceive ambiguous situations as sources of threat. People who have low levels 
of tolerance for ambiguity tend to find unstructured and uncertain situations uncomfortable 
and want to avoid these situations. Subjects were asked to grade questions like living in a 
foreign country, facing complex situations, or be among people alike to oneself, on a 7-point 
Likert scale for attractiveness. Cronbach's alpha for the scale is .58, which is in line with 
previous studies (Budner, 1962; Dollinger, 1983; Cabantous, 2007). 
 
2.3 Social preferences and beliefs 
Previous studies have shown that unconditional altruism not only correlates with trust 
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2009), but also explain a large share of trusting (Cox, 2004). 
Additionally, social preferences can have an indirect effect on trustors’ beliefs about the 
trustworthiness of the trustees (Vyrastekova and Garikipati, 2005). We therefore apply the 
value orientation task (ring test) (Liebrand, 1984; Offerman, Sonnemans and Schram, 1996) 
to measure individual social preferences. By collecting 24 decisions on pairs of payoffs this 
task measures the willingness to increase/decrease the payoff of an anonymous co-player at 
a cost. All pair of choices can be represented in a circle on adjacent equally spaced 
coordinates. The horizontal axis of the imaginary circle indicates the amount of money 
allocated to oneself and the vertical axis indicates the amount of money allocated to the 
other anonymous person. Summing all decisions, a measure of the unconditional willingness 
to give or take is obtained, with individualistic subjects characterized by a final payoff vector 
with an angle close to zero, while pro-social subjects have a positive angle, and pro-self 
subjects a negative angle. 
Finally, beliefs about trustees’ reciprocity affect trust (Dufwenberger and Gneezy, 
2000: Gneezy et al., 2000). In the ATG, beliefs could have affected subjects’ transfer in their 
role as trustor. We therefore collected subjects’ beliefs by administering a non-incentivized 
questionnaire in which they indicated (on a 5-point Likert scale) how likely they considered 
each of the scenarios of trustworthiness from the RTG to materialize. The variable ‘beliefs’ 
records the most likely scenario of x0, x1,…,x4 that subjects expect and increases in the 
subjects optimism about the general trustworthiness in trustees.10 We chose not to ask for 
beliefs with regard to trustees’ reciprocity in the ATG as subjects might state their beliefs in 
line with their revealed choices as a way of justification. 
In our regression analyses we control for the effects of social preferences and beliefs 
when testing for the effect of the source and type of uncertainty on trust in the ATG. 
                                               
10
 When the highest score was attached to more than one scenario, we took the average. 
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2.4 Procedures 
The experiments were conducted at ELSE (Experimental Laboratory for Sociology 
and Economics) at the University of Utrecht. Participants were 92 students (49 females and 
43 males). The experiments were computerized using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). We used ‘tokens’ as experimental currency with an exchange rate of 50 Eurocents 
per token. At the end of each session, subjects were paid, in cash and in private, €11.50 on 
average for a session lasting about one hour. 
In the experiment, we control for individual heterogeneity by implementing a within-
subject design. Subjects submit their decisions in two blocks. The first contains both 
versions of the trust game, ATG and RTG, followed by the questionnaire on the most likely 
probability distribution in the RTG. The second block contains several incentivized, auxiliary 
measures of lottery risk preferences, lottery ambiguity preferences and social preferences. 
We balance the order of the trust games (RTG before or after the ATG), as well as the order 
of the block of auxiliary measures, which is administered either before or after the trust 
games (see Table 1). A non-incentivized post-experimental questionnaire, including the 
ambiguity tolerance scale and demographics, was administered at the end of the 
experiment.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE. 
 
All decisions are one-shot, and hence we delayed any feedback about the decision of 
others and the outcomes of the randomization devices until the end of the experiment. The 
instructions for all tasks and the questionnaire for ambiguity tolerance can be found in the 
appendix. 
3. Experimental results 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
The average transfer in the ATG is 3.359 of a maximum of 10 tokens (see Figure 1 
for a distribution of transfer decisions). Compared to Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), 
where 15% of trustors transferred the maximum amount and 6% transferred zero with an 
average transfer of half of the endowment, our trustors show on average somewhat less 
trust. The transfer distribution reveals the common peaks at the extreme transfers, as well as 
a considerable mass of transfers between zero and half of the endowment. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE. 
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Transfers for all scenarios in the RTG can be found in Figure 2. As expected, they 
depend on the number of trustworthy trustees in each scenario. The average transfer 
increases with the number of trustworthy trustees11; but we also observe that about 30% of 
subjects transfer more than zero in the scenario with zero trustworthy trustees. These 
positive transfers may reflect mistakes, warm glow from investing, or even belief that one 
can beat the odds even when this contradicts the available information (Andreoni and Miller, 
2002; Ortmann et al., 2000). Most of these subjects transfer one or two units only, 
suggesting that some motivation rather than misunderstanding or white noise guide their 
seemingly irrational behavior. At the other extreme, most of the subjects (73%) transfer the 
whole endowment when the probability to meet a trustworthy trustee is equal to one. Here, 
the omission to transfer the whole endowment, next to mistakes, may be explained by 
competitive social preferences because any transfer below 10 creates a payoff disparity to 
the advantage of the trustor. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE. 
 
Subjects who transfer an amount between zero and ten in scenarios with only 
untrustworthy or only trustworthy trustees respectively do not differ from the other 
participants on any of the variables measured in our experiment. We therefore do not 
exclude any subject from our main analysis. However, as a robustness check, we exclude all 
subjects from the regression analyses, who send above zero and below ten in the scenarios 
x0 and x4, respectively. This results in a smaller sample of 51 subjects (henceforth 
‘robustness sample’). All the results reported in this paper remain qualitatively valid, unless 
mentioned otherwise when the results are presented. 
More details and descriptive statistics on lottery risk (Table 4), lottery ambiguity 
(Table 5), social preferences (Table 6), beliefs in the risky trust game (Table 7), ambiguity 
tolerance (Table 8) and correlation matrices of all measures (Table 9) are presented in the 
appendix. 
 
3.2 Are sources of uncertainty relevant for trusting decisions? 
Trustors’ choices in the RTG are used to calculate their social risk preferences and, 
subsequently, to test if these preferences predict transfer in the ATG. Moreover we expect to 
find no link between lottery risk preferences and transfers in the ATG. 
                                               
11
 Average transfers in the scenarios with 0, 1,...4 trustworthy trustees respectively are 1.02, 1.83, 
3.45, 6.28 and 8.59. 
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To test whether social risk preferences estimated from the choices in the RTG can 
explain trust behavior in the ATG we specify an OLS regression with the transferred amount 
in the ATG as dependent variable and trustors’ individual characteristics as independent 
variables. Table 2 presents the results of several models where Social risk preferences is 
the estimated power in the power utility function, Lottery risk preferences is the number of 
risky choices in the Holt & Laury lottery setup, Social preferences is the angle of the final 
payoff vector in the social value orientation task, and Beliefs is the specific scenario in the 
RTG that subjects indicated as most likely.12 In all regressions models, we control for 
gender, study background, order of experimental tasks and heteroskedasticity. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE. 
 
The results from Table 2 clearly show that social risk preferences significantly 
influence transfers in the ATG.13 In line with previous studies (Dufwenberger and Gneezy, 
2000; Gneezy et al., 2000) we find that beliefs also play a role. In line with the theory of 
betrayal aversion (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004) very few subjects can be indicated as risk 
seeking in the risky trust game (a parameter α with a score of higher than 1). Therefore we 
made three equal groups of subjects ranging from most social risk averse to least social risk 
averse. Subjects who are less social risk averse send, on average, nearly 4 tokens more in 
the ATG compared to subjects who are most social risk averse (see Figure 3; Jonckheere-
Terpstra, p<0.001)14. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE. 
 
As expected, we find no relation between lottery risk preferences and transfers in 
ATG (as also shown in Eckel and Wilson, 2004; Ashraf et al., 2006; Ben-Ner and 
Halldorsson, 2010; Houser et al., 2010 and Etang et al., 2011).  
Overall, these results support our proposal to acknowledge the source of uncertainty 
as a critical factor when explaining trust decisions in the classic trust game, and they also 
                                               
12
 Social preferences are categorized as in Kanagaretnam et al. (2009). Please refer to the appendix 
for the distribution and correlations of these individual characteristics. 
13
 For the robustness sample the beta coefficient of social risk preferences is highly significant as well, 
but also has a value of 13.881 in model 1 and 12.179 in model 3. 
14
 Jonckheere (1954) developed a non-parametric test for ordered relationships. In the case of two 
samples it reduces to the Mann–Whitney test. In our case the null hypothesis is that there are no 
systematic relationships among the medians of the three different groups of social risk preferences on 
transfer in the ATG, against the alternative that the medians are ordered from risk-averse (lowest) to 
risk-seeking (highest). 
13 
 
provide an explanation why previous studies failed to find a link between risk preferences, 
measured via a lottery setup, and trust. 
 
3.3 Is the type of uncertainty relevant for trusting decisions? 
Trustors in the classic trust game face ambiguity as they have no objective 
information on the probability of trustworthy behavior of the trustees. According to a 
substantial body of experimental evidence on ambiguity, most people are averse to 
ambiguity, at least in medium ranges of underlying objective probabilities (e.g., Camerer and 
Weber, 1992; Wakker, 2010). As the subjects face ambiguity in the ATG, but only risk in the 
RTG, we expect that subjects transfer less in the ATG than in the RTG. In a first, univariate 
test we therefore statistically compare the average amount that subjects transferred in the 
ATG with the average amount transferred in the RTG, weighted with their beliefs about the 
likelihood of the scenarios in the RTG. We find that the average transfer of 3.359 in the ATG 
(also see above) is lower than the weighted average transfer in the RTG, which is 3.900. 
The difference is statistically significant at a 94.4% level of confidence (two-tailed, paired t-
test with p=0.056). Hence, we establish a treatment effect that is due to the existence of 
ambiguity in the ATG, which is the only difference to the RTG. 
We can now analyze whether and to which extent transfers in the ATG can be 
explained with measurements of ambiguity preferences. Figure 4 shows the transfers in the 
ATG of three categories of individuals with increasing ambiguity tolerance (questionnaire 
measure). In support of our expectation, subjects in the category with the highest tolerance 
for ambiguity transfer on average 1.75 tokens more in the ATG than subjects categorized 
with a low tolerance for ambiguity (Jonckheere Terpstra, p = 0.075).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE. 
 
This univariate result remains robust in a multivariate OLS when controlling for social 
risk preferences, social preferences, beliefs, order effects, gender and study background 
(see Models 1 and 3 in Table 3).15 As Model 5 in Table 3 show, ambiguity tolerance stays a 
significant predictor of transfers in the ATG when social risk preferences are included in the 
estimation. Thus, even when the effects of social risk are controlled for, ambiguity tolerance 
has enough explanatory power to predict the remaining variation in the ATG transfers. Also 
note that the effect of social risk preferences prevails when measures for ambiguity 
                                               
15
 We exclude lottery risk preferences from the models in Table 4 as we already showed in Table 3 
that this variable has no effect on transfer in the ATG. The results presented in Table 4 are robust 
when we would add lottery risk preferences as a control variable.  
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preference are included in the estimation.16 Thus, both, ambiguity tolerance and social risk 
seem to be significant predictors for transfers in the trust game. 
Finally, we decompose the transfers in the ATG, into a part that can be explained by 
social risk and an unexplained, remaining part, which is arguably affected by ambiguity. For 
this we first rerun Model 4 in Table 2 as a first stage regression and then use its residuals as 
dependent variable in the specification of Model 7 in Table 3. As Model 4 in Table 2 includes 
all effects of social risk, Model 7 in Table 3 estimates the variation that remains net of social 
risk. As expected, the results of Model 7 in Table 3 show that ambiguity tolerance is able to 
explain some of the remaining variation that is not explained by social risk. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE. 
 
Models 2, 4, and 6 in Table 3 correspond to Models 1, 3, and 5 discussed above, 
with the only difference that the questionnaire measure for ambiguity tolerance is replaced 
with lottery ambiguity preferences. We find no relationship between lottery ambiguity 
preferences and transfers in the ATG. This also applies to Model 7 in Table 3, where lottery 
ambiguity preferences are not able to explain variation in the residuals of Model 4 in Table 2. 
A general comparison between Table 2 and 3 shows that both lottery risk 
preferences and lottery ambiguity preferences fail to explain transfers in the ATG. This 
suggests that the misalignment of the sources of uncertainty make lottery measurements 
poor predictors for trust behavior. It also suggests that the effects of this misalignment cut 
across the types of uncertainty, as they apply not only to risk, but also to ambiguity.  
 
3.4 Additional observation 
It is worth mentioning that the order in which the ambiguous and the risky 
environment are presented to the subjects in the experiment affects their transfer in the 
ambiguous trust game. This is in line with Fox and Tversky (1995), who coined the term 
‘Comparative Ignorance’ for the phenomenon that facing a comparative task with risk before 
ambiguity leads to more ambiguity aversion than without prior exposure to risk. Similarly, in 
our experiment, subjects who first participated in the RTG transfer, on average, 1.5 tokens 
less in the ATG compared to subjects who were first exposed to ATG. This order effect is 
significant (Mann-Whitney test, Z = -2.69, P = 0.007; Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test, Z = 1.57, P = 
0.014) and can also be seen in Tables 2 and 3, where the negative and statistically 
                                               
16
 The outcomes of these OLS models remain robust, except for Model 7 in Table 3 for the robustness 
sample and for the effects of ambiguity tolerance in Table 3, when we run Tobit Maximum Likelihood 
estimation models with 0 and 10 as lower and upper bounds, respectively. 
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significantly coefficient of the dummy variable indicates an ordering of RTG before ATG 
(equal 1 and 0 otherwise). 
4. Conclusions  
Although a thorough understanding of sources of uncertainty and how they feed into 
the decision-making processes under uncertainty is yet to be developed, previous studies 
identified a number of factors that may differ across sources. Losing money to a 
randomization device (nature) can be perceived as bad luck, but incurring a loss to another 
decision maker is likely to be interpreted as a wrong judgment; a signal of failure to assess 
the social situation properly (Trautmann et al., 2008); or as an exposure to a conscious 
betrayal (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004). Losing a lottery can at most harm self-image, but 
losing in social interactions can also have consequences in terms of social status and 
reputation. Various experimental studies support this mechanism specifically for ambiguous 
choices and label this as ‘fear of negative evaluation’ (Curley et al., 1986; Heath and 
Tversky, 1991; Taylor, 1995). Nevertheless, our knowledge about the origins of the source 
dependency is still very limited when it comes to attitudes towards uncertainty, for ambiguity 
and for risk. 
In the absence of a detailed understanding of how decision makers distinguish and 
perceive various sources of uncertainty, in this paper we suggest to isolate the impact of risk 
in trust decisions while preserving the source of uncertainty. We therefore developed a risky 
trust game where risk is objectively known. As in the classic trust game, trustees represent 
the source of risk. This allows us to capture a subject’s social risk preference in a trust game 
setting. Our results show that social risk preferences that pertain to the same source of risk 
significantly predict transfer in the classic trust game while lottery risk preferences (with a 
mechanistic source) do not. Furthermore our results indicate that ambiguity preferences also 
have the potential to partially explain trust. In the classic trust game the trustor faces at least 
some ambiguity, as he/she has no objective information about the trustee’s trustworthiness. 
We find indications that subjects with a higher tolerance for ambiguity show more trust 
compared to subjects with lower tolerance for ambiguity. This result only holds for a 
questionnaire measure of ambiguity preferences and not for a lottery based measurement of 
ambiguity. Therefore, in line with our results on risk, we also find indications that the sources 
of ambiguity may play a role in explaining transfers in the trust game. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 Order of treatments. 
 
Session 1 and 3 Session 2 Session 4 and 6 Session 5 
30 students 18 students 30 students 14 students 
Auxiliary measures Auxiliary measures Trust Game Trust Game 
Ambiguity preferences Ambiguity preferences Ambiguous trust game  Risky trust game  
Social preferences Social preferences Risky trust game  Ambiguous trust game  
Risk preferences Risk preferences Beliefs Beliefs 
Trust Game Trust Game Auxiliary measures Auxiliary measures 
Ambiguous trust game  Risky trust game  Ambiguity preferences Ambiguity preferences 
Risky trust game  Ambiguous trust game  Social preferences Social preferences 
Beliefs Beliefs Risk preferences Risk preferences 
Questionnaire Questionnaire Questionnaire Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
Table 2 OLS regression models: sources of risk (social risk and lottery risk) 
 
Transfer ATG 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Constant 
4.260           
(0.684) 
2.644         
(1.214) 
1.555        
(1.234) 
3.165        
(0.737) 
Social risk preferences 
0.333***           
(0.096) 
- - 
0.373***        
(0.094) 
Lottery risk preferences - 
0.334         
(0.240) 
0.349         
(0.234) 
- 
Social preferences - - 
-0.002         
(0.016) 
-0.003         
(0.015) 
Beliefs - - 
0.677**         
(0.303) 
0.745**         
(0.299) 
Gender 
-0.168            
(0.799) 
-0.092         
(0.826) 
-0.220         
(0.868) 
-0.293         
(0.826) 
Economic study background 
-0.095           
(0.834) 
-0.089         
(0.810) 
-0.142         
(0.810) 
-0.142        
(0.829) 
Order - RTG before ATG                           
(Session 2 and 5) 
-1.452**          
(0.746) 
-1.381*         
(0.769) 
-1.229*        
(0.752) 
-1.303*        
(0.732) 
Order - Auxiliary measures before 
Trust Game (Session 1 - 3) 
-0.358           
(0.696) 
-0.236        
(0.708) 
-0.401         
(0.813) 
-0.564         
(0.780) 
N 92 92 92 92 
F test (5, 86) 3.82 (5, 86) 1.43  (7, 84) 2.44 (7, 84) 5.11 
Prob. > F 0.0036 0.2228 0.0253 0.0001 
R - squared 0.1102 0.0676 0.1310 0.1859 
***, **, * significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-corrected (robust) standard errors 
in parentheses. 
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Table 3 OLS regression models: type of uncertainty (social risk and ambiguity) 
 
Transfer in ATG 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant 
1.040 
(1.588) 
4.161 
(0.687) 
-0.444 
(1.634) 
3.142 
(0.746) 
-0.330 
(1.854) 
3.173 
(0.744) 
-3.393 
(1.975) 
Social risk 
preferences 
- - - - 
0.369***        
(0.092) 
0.375***        
(0.098)  
Lottery ambiguity pref. - 
0.041 
(0.094) 
- 
-0.009 
(0.097) 
- 
0.014 
(0.097) 
0.262 
(0.093) 
Ambiguity tolerance 
0.898* 
(0.506) 
- 
1.025** 
(0.508) 
- 
0.997* 
(0.545) 
- 
0.964* 
(0.557) 
Social preferences - - 
-0.003       
(0.016) 
0.002       
(0.016) 
-0.008        
(0.016) 
-0.003        
(0.015)  
Beliefs - - 
0.704**        
(0.290) 
0.670**        
(0.305) 
0.783***        
(0.282) 
0.737**       
(0.300)  
Gender 
-0.319        
(0.803) 
-0.346        
(0.832) 
-0.452        
(0.824) 
-0.477        
(0.862) 
-0.267        
(0.795) 
-0.297        
(0.835) 
-0.020 
(0.770) 
Economic study 
background 
-0.230        
(0.862) 
-0.060        
(0.846) 
-0.293        
(0.844) 
-0.129        
(0.844) 
-0.230        
(0.831) 
-0.146        
(0.834) 
-0.223 
(0.812) 
Order - RTG before 
ATG (Session 2 & 5) 
-1.350*        
(0.764) 
-1.399*        
(0.771) 
-1.198*        
(0.746) 
-1.196*        
(0.759) 
-1.298*        
(0.725) 
-1.313*       
(0.734) 
0.121 
(0.671) 
Order - Auxiliary 
measures before Trust 
Game (Session 1 - 3) 
-0.238 
(0.710) 
-0.270 
(0.729) 
-0.419 
(0.793) 
-0.453 
(0.830) 
-0.540 
(0.760) 
-0.549 
(0.786) 
0.028 
(0.703) 
N 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 
F test 
(5, 86) 
1.87 
(5, 86) 
1.34 
(7, 84) 
3.15 
(7, 84) 
2.17 
(8, 83) 
4.97 
(8, 83) 
4.39 
(6, 85) 
0.53 
Prob > F 0.1076 0.2548 0.0053 0.0452 0.0000 0.0002 0.782 
R - squared 0.0739 0.0529 0.1419 0.1133 0.2130 0.1861 0.033 
***, **, * significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-corrected (robust) standard errors 
in parentheses. 
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Fig. 1 Distribution of transfers in the ambiguous trust game (ATG) (N=92) 
 
 
Fig. 2 Distribution of transfers in the risky trust game (RTG), for each scenario (N=92) 
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Fig. 3 Social risk preferences and transfer in the ambiguous trust game (ATG, N=92) 
 
 
 
Note: The boxplot reports the mean (line with squared marker), the median (bold line), the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile 
(end of boxes), the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile (whiskers), and, if applicable, outliers beyond these percentiles 
(individual hollow dots). 
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Fig. 4 Ambiguity tolerance and transfer in the ambiguous trust game (ATG, N=92) 
 
Note: The boxplot reports the mean (line with squared marker), the median (bold line), the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile 
(end of boxes), the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile (whiskers), and, if applicable, outliers beyond these percentiles 
(individual hollow dots). 
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Appendix: Instructions 
 
(Note: In the instructions that were actually used in the experimental sessions, the task names were replaced by 
numbers [Task 1, Task 2, etc.] that simply indicated the order of the tasks as presented to the subjects.) 
INTRODUCTION 
 
You will now participate in an economic experiment.  In this experiment, you will earn money depending on the 
decisions that you will make. For this reason, it is very important that you read these instructions carefully. 
 
During the experiment, your income will be expressed in tokens. The total amount of tokens which you earn will 
be converted to Euro’s at the end of the experiment; the following conversion rate applies: 
 
1 token = € 0,50 
 
You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment. The payment will be made in privacy; no other participant 
will learn how much you earned. 
 
Please note that you are not allowed to communicate with other participants during this experiment. Should you 
have any questions, please raise your hand and we will come to you to answer them. Note however that we do 
not answer questions of the type - ‘what shall I do in the experiment’ – this is your own choice. We, however, are 
happy to answer questions on how to use the computer to make decision, and to explain the details of the 
experiment instructions. 
 
The experiment consists of five independent Tasks. At the beginning of each task, you will receive instructions.  
You will make decisions in each of the Tasks, and will be paid based on your decisions, and possibly decisions of 
other subjects in the experiment.  
At the end of the experiment, you will learn the outcome of each Task, as well as how many tokens you collected 
in the individual Tasks. The total amount earned in the experiment will be then paid to you, individually. No other 
experiment participant will learn how much you earned. 
 
Lottery ambiguity task 
 
This task consists of two parts. In EACH part, there are 20 rows. In each row, you are asked to choose 
between Option A and B. After the experiment, the computer will randomly pick one of the 20 rows of each part of 
the Task, and determine your earnings based on your decision in these rows. 
 
If you choose option A in the selected row, you will receive the amount of tokens given at this row. If you choose 
option B, the computer will randomly pick one out of 10 balls. Each ball is either blue or yellow. If the color of the 
ball picked by the computer is yellow, your earning will be 5 tokens, otherwise 0 tokens. 
 
There is only one difference between part 1 and part 2 of this task. 
 
In part 1, THERE ARE 5 blue and 5 yellow balls, and the computer randomly picks one out of them. 
In part 2, YOU WILL NOT learn from how many blue and yellow balls there are among the 10 balls, and 
any composition of the two colors of the balls is possible.  
 
Please turn page to view the description of the two parts of the task. 
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1) In this first part of the task, there are 10 balls: 5 yellow balls and 5 blue balls. Please indicate for each row 
if you prefer receiving the certain amount of tokens at that row, or you choose to draw a ball. If you choose to 
draw a ball, the computer will randomly select one out of the 5 blue and 5 yellow balls, and the color of the 
selected ball will determine your earnings. You will be asked to enter your decision at the computer screen. 
 
Option A      Option B 
1 O I choose the certain amount of 0.25 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
2 O I choose the certain amount of 0.50 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
3 O I choose the certain amount of 0.75 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
4 O I choose the certain amount of 1 tokens  O I choose to draw a ball 
5 O I choose the certain amount of 1.25 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
6 O I choose the certain amount of 1.50 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
7 O I choose the certain amount of 1.75 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
8 O I choose the certain amount of 2 tokens  O I choose to draw a ball 
9 O I choose the certain amount of 2.25 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
10 O I choose the certain amount of 2.50 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
11 O I choose the certain amount of 2.75 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
12 O I choose the certain amount of 3 tokens  O I choose to draw a ball 
13 O I choose the certain amount of 3.25 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
14 O I choose the certain amount of 3.50 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
15 O I choose the certain amount of 3.75 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
16 O I choose the certain amount of 4 tokens  O I choose to draw a ball 
17 O I choose the certain amount of 4.25 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
18 O I choose the certain amount of 4.50 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
19 O I choose the certain amount of 4.75 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
20 O I choose the certain amount of 5 tokens  O I choose to draw a ball 
 
2) In this second part of the task, there are 10 balls: but you will not be informed how many of them are 
blue and how many are yellow. Please indicate for each row if you choose the certain amount at that row, 
or you choose to draw a ball. If you choose to draw a bal, the computer will randomly select one out ten balls 
of unknown color mix between yellow and blue balls, and the color of the selected ball will determine your 
earnings. You will be asked to enter your decision at the computer screen. 
 
Option A      Option B 
1 O I choose the certain amount of 0.25 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
2 O I choose the certain amount of 0.50 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
3 O I choose the certain amount of 0.75 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
4 O I choose the certain amount of 1 tokens  O I choose to draw a ball 
5 O I choose the certain amount of 1.25 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
6 O I choose the certain amount of 1.50 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
7 O I choose the certain amount of 1.75 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
8 O I choose the certain amount of 2 tokens  O I choose to draw a ball 
9 O I choose the certain amount of 2.25 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
10 O I choose the certain amount of 2.50 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
11 O I choose the certain amount of 2.75 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
12 O I choose the certain amount of 3 tokens  O I choose to draw a ball 
13 O I choose the certain amount of 3.25 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
14 O I choose the certain amount of 3.50 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
15 O I choose the certain amount of 3.75 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
16 O I choose the certain amount of 4 tokens  O I choose to draw a ball 
17 O I choose the certain amount of 4.25 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
18 O I choose the certain amount of 4.50 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
19 O I choose the certain amount of 4.75 tokens O I choose to draw a ball 
20 O I choose the certain amount of 5 tokens  O I choose to draw a ball 
 
You will be informed about the outcome of this task at the end of the experiment. Please raise your hand if 
you have any questions. 
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Social preferences task 
 
In this task, you will be randomly matched to one another subject in this experiment. One of you two will be 
assigned at random the role of the SENDER in this task, and the other one is assigned the role of the 
RECEIVER.  
You will learn whether you are SENDER or RECEIVER in this task, only at the end of the experiment.  Therefore, 
you have to indicate your choice below for the case that you will be assigned the role of the SENDER. 
 
In this task, you will face 24 situations. In each of them, you are asked to choose one out of two options. In case 
you will be assigned the role of the SENDER, the option that you choose could have monetary consequences for 
you and also for the other person, the RECEIVER. 
In case you will be assigned the role of the RECEIVER, the choices made by the other subject, the SENDER, will 
determine your earnings. 
 
At the end of the experiment, the computer will select one out of the 24 decision situations at random, and the 
chosen alternative of the SENDER in that situation will determine the earnings of the SENDER and the 
RECEIVER. 
 
Let us now explain the options available in each of the 24 decision situations. For each option, two numbers will 
be displayed: the number of points you will receive yourself (positive or negative) when you choose this option, 
and the number of points (positive or negative) the other subject will receive when you choose this option. These 
situations are listed below. You will be asked to enter your decision at the computer screen. 
 
 
               OPTION A             OPTION B  
  SENDER  RECEIVER 
 
SENDER 
 
RECEIVER 
SITUATION1 3 tokens      0 tokens 2.90 tokens      -0.78 tokens 
SITUATION2 2.90 tokens      -0.78 tokens 2.60 tokens      -1.50 tokens 
SITUATION3 2.60 tokens      -1.50 tokens 2.12 tokens      -2.12 tokens 
SITUATION4 2.12 tokens      -2.12 tokens 1.50 tokens      -2.6 tokens 
SITUATION5 1.50 tokens      -2.60 tokens 0.78 tokens      -2.90 tokens 
SITUATION6 0.78 tokens      -2.90 tokens 0 tokens      -3 tokens 
SITUATION7 0 tokens      -3 tokens -0.78 tokens      -2.90 tokens 
SITUATION8 -0.78 tokens      -2.90 tokens -1.5 tokens      -2.60 tokens 
SITUATION9 -1.50 tokens      -2.6 tokens -2.12 tokens      -2.12 tokens 
SITUATION10 -2.12 tokens      -2.12 tokens -2.6 tokens      -1.50 tokens 
SITUATION11 -2.60 tokens      -1.50 tokens -2.90 tokens      -0.78 tokens 
SITUATION12 -2.90 tokens      -0.78 tokens -3 tokens      0 tokens 
SITUATION13 -3 tokens      0 tokens -2.90 tokens      0.78 tokens 
SITUATION14 -2.90 tokens      0.78 tokens -2.6 tokens      1.50 tokens 
SITUATION15 -2.60 tokens      1.50 tokens -2.12 tokens      2.12 tokens 
SITUATION16 -2.12 tokens      2.12 tokens -1.50 tokens      2.6 tokens 
SITUATION17 -1.50 tokens      2.60 tokens -0.78 tokens      2.90 tokens 
SITUATION18 -0.78 tokens      2.90 tokens 0 tokens      3 tokens 
SITUATION19 0 tokens      3 tokens 0.78 tokens      2.90 tokens 
SITUATION20 0.78 tokens      2.90 tokens 1.50 tokens      2.6 tokens 
SITUATION21 1.50 tokens      2.60 tokens 2.12 tokens      2.12 tokens 
SITUATION22 2.12 tokens      2.12 tokens 2.6 tokens      1.50 tokens 
SITUATION23 2.60 tokens      1.50 tokens 2.90 tokens      0.78 tokens 
SITUATION24 2.90 tokens      0.78 tokens 3 tokens      0 tokens 
 
You will be informed about the outcome of this task at the end of the experiment. Please raise your hand if 
you have any questions. 
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Lottery risk preferences task 
 
In this task you will be presented with 10 rows. In each row, you are asked to choose one out of two alternatives.  
At the end of the experiment, the computer will choose one of these 10 rows at random, and this row will 
determine your earnings in the following way. 
 
The computer will identify which of the two options A or B did you choose in the selected row. The computer will 
then select at random one out of chips to determine your earnings.  
These chips have value which is  
 either 2 tokens or 1.60 tokens if you choose Option A, or  
 either 3.85 tokens or 0.10 tokens, if you choose Option B. 
 
In each row, the number of chips with the respective prizes the computer selects from is described below. For 
example, in row 1 in Option A, the computer chooses one out of 10 chips, where one of these chips has the prize 
2 tokens, and 9 of these chips have the prize 1.60 tokens 
 
You will be asked to enter your decision at the computer screen. 
 
Option A      Option B 
1/10 of 2 tokens, 9/10 of 1.60 tokens  1/10 of 3.85 tokens, 9/10 of 0.10 tokens 
2/10 of 2 tokens, 8/10 of 1.60 tokens  2/10 of 3.85 tokens, 8/10 of 0.10 tokens 
3/10 of 2 tokens, 7/10 of 1.60 tokens  3/10 of 3.85 tokens, 7/10 of 0.10 tokens 
4/10 of 2 tokens, 6/10 of 1.60 tokens  4/10 of 3.85 tokens, 6/10 of 0.10 tokens 
5/10 of 2 tokens, 5/10 of 1.60 tokens  5/10 of 3.85 tokens, 5/10 of 0.10 tokens 
6/10 of 2 tokens, 4/10 of 1.60 tokens  6/10 of 3.85 tokens, 4/10 of 0.10 tokens 
7/10 of 2 tokens, 3/10 of 1.60 tokens  7/10 of 3.85 tokens, 3/10 of 0.10 tokens 
8/10 of 2 tokens, 2/10 of 1.60 tokens  8/10 of 3.85 tokens, 2/10 of 0.10 tokens 
9/10 of 2 tokens, 1/10 of 1.60 tokens  9/10 of 3.85 tokens, 1/10 of 0.10 tokens 
10/10 of 2 tokens, 0/10 of 1.60 tokens    10/10 of 3.85 tokens, 0/10 of 0.10 tokens 
 
You will be informed about the outcome of this task at the end of the experiment. Please raise your hand if 
you have any questions. 
 
Trust game task 
 
General description: 
 
In this task, your earnings will depend on your decision and the decision of one randomly selected other 
participant in this experiment. You will not learn the identity of this participant, neither during nor after the 
experiment.  
 
In this task, one of the subjects in the pair will be assigned the role of SENDER, and the other one will be 
assigned the role of RECEIVER. We will now explain the payments and the decision procedure. 
 
The payments: 
 
At the beginning of this Task, both SENDER and RECEIVER will receive an endowment of 10 tokens.  
 
Then, SENDER will be asked to make a choice first. SENDER will be asked to choose how many of his/her 10 
tokens he/she transfers to RECEIVER.  
 SENDER can choose to send either 0, 1, 2 … 10 tokens to RECEIVER. 
 
The tokens will be multiplied by three on the way to RECEIVER, i.e. RECEIVER receives three times as many 
tokens as SENDER transferred to him/her. 
 
After that, RECEIVER will be asked to make a choice. RECEIVER will be asked how many tokens he/she wants 
to send back to SENDER from the tokens received. RECEIVER can choose either to send back nothing, or to 
send back half of the received tokens. 
 RECEIVER can choose to send back either one half of the received tokens, or nothing.  
 
At the end of the task, the payments to SENDER and RECEIVER will be made based on the tokens they hold, 
that means: 
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SENDER will be paid for  
 
(10 tokens) MINUS (number of tokens transferred to RECEIVER) PLUS (tokens received from RECEIVER) 
 
and 
 
RECEIVER will be paid for  
 
(10 tokens) PLUS (three times number of tokens transferred by SENDER to RECEIVER) MINUS (either half 
of the received tokens, or zero, depending on RECEIVER’s decision) 
  
The decision procedure: 
We will now describe the procedure by which you will make your decisions in this Task. 
In the experiment, you will be randomly assigned the role of SENDER , or the role of RECEIVER. The computer 
will match at random subjects into pairs, consisting of one SENDER and one RECEIVER. You will learn your role 
only at the end of the experiment. Therefore, we will ask you to submit your decision both as SENDER and as 
RECEIVER. Your decision in the role randomly assigned to you will determine your earnings in the following way. 
 
The decision procedure of sender: 
 
Each SENDER will be faced with a situation of being randomly matched to one out of FOUR possible 
RECEIVERS. We will ask you, in the role of the SENDER, to submit your decision on how many tokens you 
choose to send to the RECEIVER. You will do it in SIX possible scenarios. Please be aware that you have an 
endowment of 10 tokens in every possible scenario. You need to decide how much of this 10 tokens to send to 
the RECEIVER in each of the six scenarios. 
 
One scenario without information: 
 
In one of these scenarios, you will not be informed about the choices of the four possible RECEIVERS. You will 
be simply asked to choose the number of tokens to send to the RECIVER. Then one out of the four possible 
RECEIVERS will be randomly matched to you. 
 
Five scenarios with information: 
 
In five scenarios, you will be able to choose the number of tokens you send to the RECEIVER. You have to 
choose the number of tokens that you send for each of the following scenarios: 
 
 none of the four possible receivers returns back half of the received tokens 
 one of the four possible receivers returns back half of the received tokens 
 two of the four possible receivers returns back half of the received tokens 
 three of the four possible receivers returns back half of the received tokens 
 all of the four possible receivers returns back half of the received tokens. 
 
After the four possible RECEIVERS have made their choices, we will count the number of RECEIVERS which 
chose to send back half of the tokens. This number will then determine which of the five above scenarios (with 
information) the computer will consider when calculating your earnings for this part of the experiment. Thus, out 
of these five scenarios, only one can be an actual scenario that is relevant for your earnings. In this actual 
scenario, one out of the four possible RECEIVERS is then randomly matched with you. 
 
You will submit your decisions at six different computer screens, one for each of the six scenarios. 
 
After your six decisions, the computer will randomly select either the scenario without information, or the one 
actual scenario with information, to be the scenario that is relevant for your earnings. Depending on your 
decision, how much to send in this specific scenario, and on the RECEIVER’S individual decision on returning 
back half or not, your payoff for this task is determined. 
 
The decision procedure of receiver 
 
After the decision made by SENDER, the RECEIVER will make his/her decision.  
 
 DECISION OF RECEIVER IS either RETURN NOTHING or RETURN ONE HALF 
 
Note that RECEIVER will not be informed about how many tokens did SENDER transfer to him/her, but makes 
only one decision to either send nothing or half of the received tokens back. 
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At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly assign the role of SENDER to half of the subjects, and 
the role of RECEIVER to the other half. 
 
Your payments will depend on the role that is assigned to you, and the decision of the subject matched to you by 
the computer, in the other role, as described above. 
 
Post-experimental questionnaire on ambiguity tolerance 
 
1.  An expert who doesn't come up with a definite answer probably doesn't know too much 
2.  I would like to live in a foreign country for a while. 
3.  There is really no such thing as a problem that can't be solved. 
4.  People who fit their lives to a schedule probably miss most of the joy of living. 
5.  A good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be done are always clear. 
6.  It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to solve a simple one. 
7. In the long run it is possible to get more done by tackling small, simple problems rather than large and 
complicated ones. 
8.  Often the most interesting and stimulating people are those who don't mind being different and original. 
9.  What we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar. 
10. People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don't know how complicated things really are. 
11. A person who leads an even, regular life in which few surprises or unexpected happenings arise really 
has a lot to be grateful for. 
12. Many of our most important decisions are based upon insufficient information. 
  13. I like parties where I know most of the people more than ones where all or most of the people are 
complete strangers. 
14. Teachers or supervisors who hand out vague assignments give one a chance to show initiative and 
originality. 
15. The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better. 
16. A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way of looking at things. 
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Appendix: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrices 
 
Table 4 Lottery risk preferences 
Number of risky choices Total (N=92) Holt and Laury (2002) 
0-1 0.03 (3) 0.01 
2 0.00 (0) 0.03 
3 0.27 (25) 0.13 
4 0.35 (32) 0.23 
5 0.16 (15) 0.26 
6 0.16 (15) 0.26 
7 0.01 (1) 0.06 
8 0.01 (1) 0.01 
9-10 0.00 (0) 0.01 
Mean  4 4.8 
 
Table 5 Lottery ambiguity preferences 
Difference in the number of uncertain outcomes between lottery with known composition of balls 
versus unknown composition of balls 
Difference Total (N=92) Type 
-17 0.01 (1) Ambiguity averse 
{- 9,…,  -1} 0.30 (28) Ambiguity averse 
0 0.24 (22) Ambiguity neutral 
{1 ,…,9} 0.45 (41) Ambiguity seeking 
 
Table 6 Social preferences 
Social preferences categorization Total (N=92) 
Pro-self 0.5 (46) 
Individualistic 0.23 (21) 
Pro-social 0.27 (25) 
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Note: When the highest score was attached to more than one RTG scenario, we report the average. 
Table 8 Ambiguity tolerance (scale 1-7) 
Mean Min Max Std. dev. 
3.51 0.75 5.06 0.567 
 
 
Table 7 Beliefs with regard to Risky trust game (RTG): scenarios that subjects find most likely 
 
RTG scenario Frequency in % (N=92) 
0 0.18 (17) 
0.5 0.09 (8) 
1 0.12 (11) 
1.5 0.02 (2) 
2 0.31 (29) 
2.5 0.08 (7) 
3 0.09 (8) 
3.5 0.00 (0) 
4 0.11 (10) 
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Table 9 Correlation Matrix of independent variables (N=92) (Pearson Correlation Coefficient)   
  
Lottery risk 
preferences  Ambiguity tolerance 
Lottery ambiguity 
preferences Social preferences Beliefs 
Transfer 
ATG 
Social risk preferences -0.01 0.06 -0.1 0.13 -0.1 0.242** 
 (0.921) (0.576) (0.353) (0.222) (0.338) 
(0.020) 
Lottery risk preferences 1 0.42*** -0.1 0.21** -0.04 0.151 
   (0.000) (0.348) (0.041) (0.719) 
(0.151) 
Ambiguity tolerance   1 -0.08 0.24** -0.06 0.169 
     (0.428) (0.019) (0.547) 
(0.108) 
Lottery ambiguity pref.     1 0.13 0.20* 0.019 
       (0.234) (0.062) 
(0.859) 
Social preferences       1 -0.04 0.057 
         (0.732) 
(0.590) 
Beliefs 
        1 0.255** 
          (0.014) 
***, **, * significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level, respectively; p-values in parentheses 
 
